|Quine, Willard Van Orman
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Skepticism: confusion between truth and evidence - as such not incoherent (glau, time t) - doubt also still immanent.
Davidsson I 54
"Everything different"/skepticism/Stroud: It could be that everything is to be different than we imagine - Quine: that would be a distinction without a difference: since the observation sentences are holophrastically conditioned to stimuli, the relations to the evidence remain unchanged - preserve the structure and you will preserve everything - (s) then everything was different yesterday already.
Stroud I 223
Skepticism/Knowledge//Quine: if all knowledge is put to the test at the same time, you cannot invoke any part of it - "that makes sensual experience necessary -".
Stroud I 225
Skepticism/Quine: the tradition has not even recognized its strength. The doubt about knowledge stems from knowledge itself - "the solution as well -" illusion: is only relative to the previously accepted assumption of real bodies".
Quine/Stroud: does not make the mistake of Austin: (distortion of meaning, see above) -" it’s not about the meaning of a given term -" Quine goes to the roots (language learning).
Skeptical doubts are scientific doubts.
Stroud I 228
Skepticism/Quine: if science is true, it can never say whether the world is the way we perceive it due to the meagre inputs -" then just as little knowledge would be possible as if science was wrong.
Stroud I 231
Skepticism/QuineVsSkepticism: is an overreaction to the uncertainty of individual options -" Solution: reflection takes place within science, not beyond it.
Stroud I 248
Skepticism/StroudVsQuine: if all beliefs were only projections from meager data (underdetermination) -" Knowledge: is then a combination of many subjective and few objective factors - then all hypotheses are real competitors -" no objective superiority - important argument: this is exactly the view of traditional epistemology.
Stroud I 248
QuineVsSkepticism: if we deprive philosophy of its external view, it is sufficient in order to exclude the total skepticism -" (naturalized epistemology) -" StroudVsQuine: This does not work as long as we consider our own knowledge as projection beyond the data)
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953
Bezeichnung und Referenz
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984