Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Quine, Willard Van Orman
 
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Skepticism II 37
Skepticism: confusion between truth and evidence - as such not incoherent (glau, time t) - doubt also still immanent.
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Davidsson I 54
"Everything different"/skepticism/Stroud: It could be that everything is to be different than we imagine - Quine: that would be a distinction without a difference: since the observation sentences are holophrastically conditioned to stimuli, the relations to the evidence remain unchanged - preserve the structure and you will preserve everything - (s) then everything was different yesterday already.
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Stroud I 223
Skepticism/Knowledge//Quine: if all knowledge is put to the test at the same time, you cannot invoke any part of it - "that makes sensual experience necessary -".
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Stroud I 225
Skepticism/Quine: the tradition has not even recognized its strength. The doubt about knowledge stems from knowledge itself - "the solution as well -" illusion: is only relative to the previously accepted assumption of real bodies".
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I 227
Quine/Stroud: does not make the mistake of Austin: (distortion of meaning, see above) -" it’s not about the meaning of a given term -" Quine goes to the roots (language learning).
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I 228
Skeptical doubts are scientific doubts.
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Stroud I 228
Skepticism/Quine: if science is true, it can never say whether the world is the way we perceive it due to the meagre inputs -" then just as little knowledge would be possible as if science was wrong.
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Stroud I 231
Skepticism/QuineVsSkepticism: is an overreaction to the uncertainty of individual options -" Solution: reflection takes place within science, not beyond it.
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Stroud I 248
Skepticism/StroudVsQuine: if all beliefs were only projections from meager data (underdetermination) -" Knowledge: is then a combination of many subjective and few objective factors - then all hypotheses are real competitors -" no objective superiority - important argument: this is exactly the view of traditional epistemology.
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Stroud I 248
QuineVsSkepticism: if we deprive philosophy of its external view, it is sufficient in order to exclude the total skepticism -" (naturalized epistemology) -" StroudVsQuine: This does not work as long as we consider our own knowledge as projection beyond the data)

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Strd I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984


> Counter arguments against Quine
> Counter arguments in relation to Skepticism



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-25