Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Stroud, Barry
 
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Skepticism I 13
Descartes: I cannot distinguish alertness from dream - Stroud: 1. the possibility that he dreams is really a threat to his knowledge of the world - 2. But he does not need to know whether he is dreaming to know something about the world - No knowledge: if one dreams E.g. that the shutters rattle and the dream caused it, one does not know that it rattles - (false causation, defies identity of the event).
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I 17
Alone the possibility of deception is sufficient.
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I 18
StroudVsDescartes: we can know sometimes that we are not dreaming - knowing that we do not dream is the condition for knowledge.
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I 37
Intersubjectivity: it also is affected by Descartes' skepticism.
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I 77
Platitudes/skepticism/Stroud: natural strategy VsSkepticism: 1. Objective world was there before us - "E.g. I believe that a mountain in Africa is more than 5000m high - that is completely independent of my knowledge - then it is not about assertibility conditions or truth conditions - otherwise: if you believe that we now know more about physics than 200 years ago, a reference to community and knowledge is implied - now truth condition and assertibility condition but still objectivity - Aeroplane-example: whether the manual is correct or not, is an objective fact that can be seen from the distanced position - distanced position: equivalent to skepticism - and at the same time determination that inside and outside diverge - inside: corresponds to our social practice.
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I 87
philosophical skepticism/Stroud: its problem is not empirical.
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I 110
Skepticism/Stroud: it is not sufficient to put forward a specific case - Descartes makes an assessment of all our knowledge.
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I 270
Imaginability/Stroud: it is hard to say whether something is conceivable or not - a possibility would be to imagine it and see what happens - Vs: but that is not conclusive, since it may be that what my thoughts make possible for me, is even hidden from me.
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I 272f
Dream/skepticism/Stroud: We have not yet asked if the dream opportunity is knowable to others. - StroudVs(s): we can very well "be all in the same boat" - I can use myself instead of Descartes - Stroud: I always say: it seems possible. - Imaginability: requires comprehensibility (Chapter 2) - and the possibility is comprehensible that we all dream - and then the question is whether I am dreaming, completely independent from the fact if someone else knows - then it is possible that all dream and nobody knows anything - and the skepticism is not to sit in opposition, thereby that it contradicts its premises - Conclusion: dream possibility: there is ultimately one because the possibility that someone knows something must not be presupposed - Stroud pro Descartes.

Strd I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984


> Counter arguments against Stroud
> Counter arguments in relation to Skepticism



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-24