Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Language, philosophy: language is a set of phonetic or written coded forms fixed at a time for the exchange of information or distinctions within a community whose members are able to recognize and interpret these forms as signs or symbols. In a wider sense, language is also a sign system, which can be processed by machines. See also communication, language rules, meaning, meaning change, information, signs, symbols, words, sentences, syntax, semantics, grammar, pragmatics, translation, interpretation, radical interpretation, indeterminacy._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Hartry Field on Language - Dictionary of Arguments
Avramides I 113 Belief/Meaning/FieldVsReductionism: (VsReductive Griceans): it is circular, to want to explain the semantic properties by believe. (This also says the reductionism.) >Semantic properties. Field like Grice: one can explain believe without reference to the sentence. Solution: what makes a symbol a symbol for Caesar is the role in my learning. Field: then there can be no inner language without a public language. SchifferVsField: no problem: Grice (intention based semantics, IBS) does not need to assume that propositional attitudes have been acquired before the public language. Both goes hand in hand. Only there is no logical dependence between them (and to competence). >Intention-based semantics. Armstrong: both are logically connected. ((s) This is stronger than Schiffer's thesis.). >Propositions/Schiffer, >David Armstrong, >Stephen Schiffer. --- Soames I 481 Language/Truth-Definition/Field/Soames: when truth is defined non-semantically (i.e., speaker-independent, i.e. non-physical), language becomes an abstract object. It has its characteristics essentially. >Scott Soames. With other properties, it would be a different language - that is, it could not have been shown that the expressions could have denoted anything else. Then it is still contingent on language, which language a person speaks. But the semantic properties (truth, reference, applying) are not contingent._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 Soames I Scott Soames "What is a Theory of Truth?", The Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 411-29 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 Soames II S. Soames Understanding Truth Oxford 1999 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19