Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Putnam, Hilary
 
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Language Rorty I 323
Language/Putnam/Rorty: like Wittgenstein and Goodman: language as a reflection of the world, so any non-intentional relationship, is not useful for the explanation of the acquisition and comprehension of language.
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Horwich I 457
Language/Putnam: if only noise, then nothing but an expression of our subjectivity. - Instead: Correctness: makes truth the appreciated concept in the inside view of the language game. RortyVsPlaton: but judgmental expressions are not names of esoteric entities.
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Putnam III 124
Language/intensional/Davidson: E.g. the new Minister of scientific language has prohibited the use of words that relate to emotions, thoughts, and intentions. - How do we know whether the command has been executed when the officer only speaks the new language? - The new terms coming out of his mouth may play the same role as the old. - Similarly to the use of color predicates.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-26