Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Searle, John R.
 
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Speech Act Theory II 25
Sincerity condition: internal to the speech acts.
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IV 251
Speech act/Searle: rule-determined actions - has always constitutive (not regulatory) rules - Searle: speech act: is key to the meaning - VsSearle: controversial because language rules for e.g. singular term have fundamentally different nature than for actions.
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V 68
Speech act is unequal game. - Explanation must presuppose rules - rules are not equal
Convention: speaking rule-governed behavior - rules, not behavior is crucial.
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V 207
Traditional speech act theory/Austin/Strawson/Hare: word W is needed to perform speech act A - then e.g. "good" recommends, "true" reaffirms, "knowledge" guarantees something - SearleVs: this only works with performative verbs such as "promise" but not with judgmental ones - does not satisfy the adequacy condition for semantic analysis: a word must mean in all grammatically different sentences the same - it cannot, if the meaning is supposed to be the execution of various acts.
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V 213
Wrong: to assume that the conditions for the execution of a speech act follow from the meanings of the words. ( "fallacy of assertiveness")
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IV 27
Speech act theory/SearleVsAustin: accepts verbs for acts - but one has to differentiate this - E.g. announcement of a command is not the command.
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IV 78
Speech act theory/Searle: differs from other philosophical approaches in that it gives no set of logically necessary and sufficient conditions for the explicable phenomenon - (E.g. linguistics: structural rules).
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VI 86
The illocutionary act is the function of the meaning of the sentence.
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IV 86
Fiction/speech acts/Searle: fiction has no other speech acts but is a predetermined act - in literature, no other act than in newspaper - no semantic or syntactic property proves a text as fictional.
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IV 204
Speech Act TheoryVsChomsky, VsRules, instead of semantics/pragmatics.
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VII 99
Speech act/proposition/Searle: difference: from the propositional content does not follow that the assertion conditions are satisfied - the proposition rather implies that the speaker implies within the act that they are satisfied.
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VIII 435
Speech act/Searle: is hold together by the semantic intentions of the speaker - VsChomsky: does not see the essential connection of meaning and speech acts.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-26