Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Strength of theories, philosophy: theories and systems can be compared in terms of their strength. With increasing expressiveness of a system, e.g. the possibility that statements refer to themselves, however, grows the risk of paradoxes. Strength and expressiveness do not always go hand in hand. Thus, e.g. the modal logical system S5, which is stronger than the system S4, is unable to establish a unique temporal order. Aspects of strength and weakness are inter alia the set of derivable sentences, or the size of the subject area of a theory or system. See also theories, systems, modal logic, axioms, axiom systems, expansion, mitigation, areas._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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D.M. Armstrong on Stronger/weaker - Dictionary of Arguments
III 77 Logical Necessity: is the strongest necessity. - Physical necessity: weaker because of contingency - still weaker: general quantification (mere uniformity). - N.B.: from a law we cannot conclude general quantification. - Law: physical necessity. >Laws. III 108 High/low/stronger/weaker/Armstrong: E.g. "N (F, G)" is logically stronger than "All Fs are Gs". The universal statement (general quantification, mere conjunction) is logically weaker than a law statement. >Law statements/Armstrong._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
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> Counter arguments against Armstrong
> Counter arguments in relation to Strength of Theories
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18