Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Rigidity, philosophy: Rigidity is an expression for the property of names to stand for the same object in all possible worlds, as opposed to descriptions that are not rigid and can change their reference. E.g. it is pointless to ask whether Napoleon might have been someone else but Napoleon in a possible world, but it is not meaningless to say that there is a possible world in which Napoleon is not the winner of Austerlitz. See also descriptions, names, possible worlds, range, necessity, possibility, reference, semantics of possible worlds, intensions, propositions._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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M.J. Cresswell on Rigidity - Dictionary of Arguments
II 154 Rigidity/make rigid/description/Kripke/Cresswell: (Kripke 1977(1), 259f): normal description/logical form/Cresswell: "The F is G" is true in every possible world w iff the thing (unambiguous) which is F in w, is also G in W . Rigid description/logical form: here, that is true in w iff the thing that is in the actual world F, is w in G, no matter if it is there F in w or not. - Which world is the actual one, is relative to the respective possible world. >Actuality, >Cross world identity, >Modal properties. Solution: double indexing: two possible worlds: "The F is G" is true in w2 seen from w1, iff the thing that is F is in w1 G w2. >Twodimensional Semantics. Make rigid: Makes that a sentence like "The F is G" can also stand alone. >Free-standing content. Instead: truth conditions/Cresswell: if one sees the principle advantage of truth conditions over truth values in that, that the truth conditions provide the right input conditions for further embedding, then the make rigid is not so important. >Truth values, >Truth conditions. II 155 Rigid/non-rigid/belief/modal logic/Cresswell: In contrast to modal contexts, the description is interpreted as non-rigid in belief contexts. Modal Context: is rigid. >Modal logic. 1. Saul A. Kripke 1977. Speker's Reference and Semantic Reference. Midwest Studies In Philosophy Volume 2, Issue 1 p. 255-276 - https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1977.tb00045.x_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20