## Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments | |||

Description Levels: Levels result from dividing a domain into sub-domains, for which different rules for making statements are valid. Thus, e.g. other statements are made about sets than about their elements. See also metalanguage, object language, theories, metatheory, metalogic, metasemantics, meta-ethics, meta-level, paradoxes, order, 2nd order logic, higher order logic, HOL, completeness. | |||

Author | Item | Excerpt | Meta data |
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Field, Hartry Books on Amazon |
Description Levels | II 345 Indefiniteness 2nd order: it is unclear whether an undecidable sentence has a particular truth value. --- II 354 Logic/Theory 2. order/Field/(s): excludes non-standard models better than theory 1st order - 2nd order has no impregnative comprehension scheme. --- III 33 Theory of the 1st order/Field: E.g. the theory of the space-time points - (s) E.g. theory which only uses functions but does not quantify via them. - Theory 2nd order/Field: E.g. theory of real numbers, because it quantifies via functions. - Quantities of higher order: are used for the definition of continuity and differentiability. --- III 37 Theory of 1st order/2nd order/Hilbert/Field. Variables 1st order: via points, lines, surfaces. - 2nd order: Quantities of ... - Solution/Field: quantification 2nd order in Hilbert's geometry as quantification via regions. - only axiom 2nd order: Dedekind's continuity axiom. --- III 95 f Logic 2nd order/Field: E.g. Quantors like "there are only finitely many". - ((s) quantified via quantities). - also not: E.g. "there are less Fs than Gs". - ((s) Fs and Gs only definable as sets or properties?) --- III 98 Extension of the logic: preserves us from a huge range of additionally assumed entities - e.g., what obeys the theory of gravity - QuineVs: rather accept abstract entities than to expand the logic. (Quine in this case pro Platonism). --- III 96 Platonism 1st order/Field: accepts abstract entities, but no logic 2nd order. - Problem: but it needs this (because of the power quantifiers). |
Fie I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Fie II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Fie III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 |

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-26