Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Subject, philosophy: the subject is, in the most general sense, the originator of actions and creativity as well as bearer of ideas, beliefs, perceptions, feelings and moods. In the tradition of German idealism the subject is opposed to the object. More recently, there has been a shift in the focus of the discussion to questions of access to internal states. See also I, self, subjectivity, object, idealism, actions, action theory._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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J.R. Searle on Subjects - Dictionary of Arguments
V 182 Subject/predicate/SearleVsStrawson: there is a functional difference between subject and predicate: the subject identifies the object and the predicate characterizes the already identified object. V 150 Predication/object/existence/Searle: Problem: e.g. "Sam is drunk". Question: Is there anything that corresponds to "is drunk" in the same way as Sam corresponds to "Sam"? V 151 Frege: Yes, a term. Here, it is the term "drunkenness". Problem: this violates the Leibniz Law (interchangeability salva veritate): Example: "Sam is drunkenness". Frege's solution: "the term horse is not a term, but an object". Term/Frege: "term" exhibits a predicament of language. The term "term" is used in a double sense. The term "horse" can be a grammatical subject but not a grammatical predicate of a sentence. The quality of being a horse is not itself an attribution of a quality. V 173 Frege did not succeed in demonstrating a symmetry of subject and predicate. ((s)> Brandom: proves necessary asymmetry). >Singular terms/Brandom. V 174 Term Theory/Strawson/Thesis: both the subject and the predicate identify "non-linguistic entities". They introduce them into the proposition where they are linked by a "non-relational connection". (SearleVs)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20