Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Kripke, Saul Aaron
 
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Substitutional Quantification EMD II 325ff
Substitutional Quantification/SQ/Kripke: ontologically neutral, perhaps purely linguistic - truth and satisfaction are defined here - contrast: referential quantification/RQ - refers to objects (world) - referential quantification: no satisfaction, only truth - Wallace/Tharp: thesis no difference between substitution quantification and referential quantification - KripkeVsWallace/VsTharp.
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EMD II 330
Substitutional quantification: formulas: that are no sentences do not receive any semantic interpretation here, they have only an auxiliary function - referential quantification: here such formulas define relations and are "satisfied" by sequences.
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II 367
Form/Kripke: must include sentence - well-formed/WFF/Kripke: Problem: T(a) ↔ x is not well-formed when x is replaced by strings of symbols that are no sentences and therefore no form.
Substitutional quantification/(s): needs substitution class: set of true sentences from the extended language from the set of true sentences in the source language (it must be unambiguous, i.e. the only such set) - referential quantification: does not need that.
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EMD II 332
Substitution Class/SC/Kripke: must not contain any specific descriptions.
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II 349
Substitutional Quantification/Kripke: does not interpret formulas at all - but there is satisfaction if there is a denotation relation - but only for transparency.
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EMD II 352
Substitutional quantification/Kripke: E.g. Cicero/Tullius: dramatic difference: (Sx1)((Sx2)(x1 = x2 u f(x1) u ~f(x2)) true (not interpreted), but the same with (Ex1) (Ex2) ... false (standard q) - if opacity is to be eliminated from the metalanguage, then its referential variables have to work through denotations of expressions ((s) objects), not only through expressions - then (substitutional) quantification in opaque contexts possible.
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EMD II 352
Substitutional Quantification/Quantification in opaque contexts/Kripke: E.g. R(a): may then be explicitly defined when there are suitable predicates in the metalanguage: R(a) applies only if either a) a is a formula of the form P(t) (pseudo predicate "was so-called because of its size") and d(t) is named through the term t because of the size of d(t), or b) A is a formula of the form Q(t) and d(t) is bold - so that R(a) is eliminated as a primitive notation and the metalanguage only includes referential quantification without opacity - meta-language: it had to be expanded: so that the referential variables do not only work through expressions alone, but also through the denotations of these expressions.

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989


> Counter arguments against Kripke
> Counter arguments in relation to Substitutional Quantification



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-28