## Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments | |||

Author | Item | Excerpt | Meta data |
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Kripke, Saul Aaron Books on Amazon |
Substitutional Quantification | EMD II 325ff Substitutional Quantification/SQ/Kripke: ontologically neutral, perhaps purely linguistic - truth and satisfaction are defined here - contrast: referential quantification/RQ - refers to objects (world) - referential quantification: no satisfaction, only truth - Wallace/Tharp: thesis no difference between substitution quantification and referential quantification - KripkeVsWallace/VsTharp. --- EMD II 330 Substitutional quantification: formulas: that are no sentences do not receive any semantic interpretation here, they have only an auxiliary function - referential quantification: here such formulas define relations and are "satisfied" by sequences. --- II 367 Form/Kripke: must include sentence - well-formed/WFF/Kripke: Problem: T(a) ↔ x is not well-formed when x is replaced by strings of symbols that are no sentences and therefore no form. Substitutional quantification/(s): needs substitution class: set of true sentences from the extended language from the set of true sentences in the source language (it must be unambiguous, i.e. the only such set) - referential quantification: does not need that. --- EMD II 332 Substitution Class/SC/Kripke: must not contain any specific descriptions. --- II 349 Substitutional Quantification/Kripke: does not interpret formulas at all - but there is satisfaction if there is a denotation relation - but only for transparency. --- EMD II 352 Substitutional quantification/Kripke: E.g. Cicero/Tullius: dramatic difference: (Sx1)((Sx2)(x1 = x2 u f(x1) u ~f(x2)) true (not interpreted), but the same with (Ex1) (Ex2) ... false (standard q) - if opacity is to be eliminated from the metalanguage, then its referential variables have to work through denotations of expressions ((s) objects), not only through expressions - then (substitutional) quantification in opaque contexts possible. --- EMD II 352 Substitutional Quantification/Quantification in opaque contexts/Kripke: E.g. R(a): may then be explicitly defined when there are suitable predicates in the metalanguage: R(a) applies only if either a) a is a formula of the form P(t) (pseudo predicate "was so-called because of its size") and d(t) is named through the term t because of the size of d(t), or b) A is a formula of the form Q(t) and d(t) is bold - so that R(a) is eliminated as a primitive notation and the metalanguage only includes referential quantification without opacity - meta-language: it had to be expanded: so that the referential variables do not only work through expressions alone, but also through the denotations of these expressions. |
K I S.A. Kripke Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 K III S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) InRecent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Ev I G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |

> Counter arguments against **Kripke**

> Counter arguments in relation to **Substitutional Quantification**

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-25