Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Supervenience, philosophy of mind: supervenience is an expression for a restricted dependency between areas. Elements of a region B are dependent on changes of elements of an area A, but not vice versa. Supervenience is used by some authors to explain the relationship between mental and physical processes. The assumption of a supervenience serves to circumvent more powerful assumptions like, e.g. the identity theory. See also covariance, dependency, identity theory, materialism, reductionism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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D.M. Armstrong on Supervenience - Dictionary of Arguments
Martin II 132 Supervenience/Martin: we can assume"cum" instead of supervenience. MartinVsArmstrong/VsPlace: properties are qualitative-cum-dispositional (or vice versa). - Not dispositionality supervening on the categoric property and not vice versa. - Rather than "inert", i.e., unable to make a difference or effect. Solution/Martin: reciprocal partners for mutual manifestation: E.g. Salt dissolves in water, which both are subject to change. >Dispositions, >Properties. - - - Martin III 167 Supervenience/Searle: strength supervenes causally on microstructure - no epiphenomenon - causal sufficiency of the microstructure makes the concept of supervenience superfluous - ((s) even doubling) - MartinVsSearle: how can things that are identical to parts of the whole, have a causal effect on the whole which consists of them? Absurd. >Microstructure, >Parts, cf. >Mereology. _____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 |
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> Counter arguments against Armstrong
> Counter arguments in relation to Supervenience
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-25