Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Searle, John R.
Books on Amazon
Supervenience I 146
Supervenience original ethics: moral property supposedly opposite natural properties (Moore) - there must be a feature, why something is better, but not causation but constitution by this feature.
Causation or constitution: Description - supervenience - related structure: sufficient/necessary: supervenience.
Supervenience: a) mind completely dependent on physique - b) Physical equality guarantees mental equality, but not vice versa.
Mind-Body Problem/Searle: only causality important: micro (physique) causes macro (mind) (from bottom to top) - SearleVsSupervenience: thereby superfluous - strength is causally supervenient in contrast to given molecular structure, but thereby not epiphenomenal.
Graeser I 160
Supervenience/Searle/Graeser: corresponds with sufficient but not with necessary conditions - Davidson: sets: A predicate P is supervenient in relation to a set of predicates S iff P differentiates no entities, which cannot be distinguished by S as well.

J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. M√ľnchen 2002

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-01