Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Searle, John R.
 
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Supervenience I 146
Supervenience original ethics: moral property supposedly opposite natural properties (Moore) - there must be a feature, why something is better, but not causation but constitution by this feature.
Causation or constitution: Description - supervenience - related structure: sufficient/necessary: supervenience.
Supervenience: a) mind completely dependent on physique - b) Physical equality guarantees mental equality, but not vice versa.
Mind-Body Problem/Searle: only causality important: micro (physique) causes macro (mind) (from bottom to top) - SearleVsSupervenience: thereby superfluous - strength is causally supervenient in contrast to given molecular structure, but thereby not epiphenomenal.
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Graeser I 160
Supervenience/Searle/Graeser: corresponds with sufficient but not with necessary conditions - Davidson: sets: A predicate P is supervenient in relation to a set of predicates S iff P differentiates no entities, which cannot be distinguished by S as well.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. M√ľnchen 2002


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-24