Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Facts, philosophy: facts are that which corresponds to a true statement or - according to some authors - is identical with a true statement. Problems result from possible multiple counting of objects, e.g. when it is spoken of a situation and additionally by the fact that this situation exists. Therefore, some authors consider the assumption of facts as something superfluous. See also truths of reason, factual truths, facts, truth, statements, knowledge, certainty, thought objects._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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D.M. Armstrong on Facts - Dictionary of Arguments
III 144 f Negative Facts/Negative States/Armstrong: negative facts are harmless: if something has a certain speed, then it has no other speed at the same time. - (But already implied: -> derived laws - III 147) b Solution: better assume negative properties than negative laws: otherwise laws are not instantiated ((s) >Instantiation). Negative facts: have a negative properties - But only as caused, not causal (-> derived laws.) - - - II (d) 149 General Fact(s)/Russell/Armstrong: All quantification needs "general facts" as true makers -(Armstrong pro) - Armstrong: i.e. also a Regth needs general facts - Martin: nothing in the concept of "gen facts" helps to distinguish real laws from mere GF - Armstrong: dito - Gen Facts/Armstrong: do not involve universals either - we have to go behind the general facts, since they do not involve a direct connection of types - II 150 Lewis: if they are approved, they regulate the world by prohibiting certain additional states. - - - Martin III 175 "General Fact"/Russell/Martin: no law, mere conjunction, aggregate, etc. But: Unexceptionality: can also be general fact (and still not a law). Martin III 181 General Fact/Totality: Martin: Problem: Negative facts. - Solution/Martin: the general term "what-and-how-something-exists" is of the first level ((s) not a summary of lower level entities). "what exists" has subdivisions on the same level. - Subdivisions should have the same level as the whole. - Then there is no need for a "general fact". ((s) Cf. >General facts). _____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20