Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Brandom, Robert
 
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Facts I 466ff
Definition Deflationism: denies that content in concepts can be explained with truth conditions and compliance with the facts, properties and objects (VsCorrespondence theory)
Fact: "making true": misleading: it is not the fact that p makes true that p.
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I 469
E.g. It is not the fact that the Persians were defeated by the Greeks at Plataea, which makes that the Greeks defeated the Persians at Plataea.
Facts: if facts are to be explained, the explanation does not need to refer back to something normative: The planetary orbits would also be elliptical without beings that set standards.
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Rorty VI 179 ff
Whether a statement is true does not depend on whether somebody makes it. But our linguistic practices could not be what they are, if the facts were different.
However, the non-linguistic facts could be essentially as they are, even if our linguistic practices were completely different. Form of thought.
Definition Fact/Brandom, "something assertible" (neologism by Brandom: "claimable"). - There is the act of asserting and there is "the asserted" - facts are not the "true asserted" but the assertible. - Facts make assertions true. However, inferentially.
RortyVsBrandom: It is as if I, like Moliere, refer to "the soporific power" as inferential in order to make it seem to be above suspicion.
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Brandom I 476
Fact/Brandom: no contrast between how things are and what we can say and think - Facts are (the content of) true assertions and thoughts - Wittgenstein: we don not stop opinionating when we are facing the facts.
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I 477
Wittgenstein: Facts are connected and structured by the objects and their properties.
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I 866
Negative Fact/Brandom: no mystery -> distinction between normative and non-normative expressions - also> conditional facts > modal facts - realm of facts and norms are not opposites - the normative is part of the factual.
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Seel2 III 149
Definition Fact/Brandom: Content of true assertions - Assertions/Brandom: obtain their content through the use of concepts in the context of the sentences uttered in each case. So the concept of fact can only be analysed together with the concept of assertion. However, this conceptual dependency is not genetic - the world is the epitome of all the facts, no matter when and with what success thoughts about the world are created.
"There was a time when nobody used concepts, because there was no discursive practice - but there was never a time when there were no facts - Seel: therefore, neither concepts nor facts depend on the existence of thinking beings - at the same time, the theory of discursive practice appears to be a theory of the fundamental structure of the world - Seel: KantVsBrandom: Warns just of that - (in the case of Hegel in vain) - KantVsBrandom/KantVsHegel: false: - Conclusion from thinking to being.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-27