Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Deception, philosophy: A deception is an idea that diverges from what would have been expected by the way in which this idea was caused, when the expectation or expectability is based on past experience or shared experiences and expectations of a community of subjects. See also error, causal theory of knowledge, reliability theory, knowledge, certainty, objectivity, intersubjectivity._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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H.P. Grice on Deceptions - Dictionary of Arguments
Hungerland I 281ff Lying/deception/Hungerland: one must assert something in order to lie. I 300 f Strawson: deception/lie: the deception is the exception to the rule. HungerlandVsStrawson: deception is only possible in front of the right background. - - - Avramides I 52 Deception/Grice: there are additional conditions: 2) there must be no inference element E such that S utters x by intendeding both: a) that A's determination of the reaction r is based on E and b) that A thinks S intends that a) is false. This is to prevent fraudulent intent. I 53 SchifferVs: this fails with the original counter-example. Solution/Schiffer: the solution here is mutual knowledge ad infinitum. Knowing that knowledge of a certain property is sufficient for the knowledge of a proposition. >Sufficiency, >Knowledge, >Communication. Then we also know that knowledge is sufficient. Avramides: e.g. being F, being G: speaker/listener are having intact sensory organs._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle, Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Hungerland I Isabel C. Hungerland Contextual Implication, Inquiry, 3/4, 1960, pp. 211-258 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
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> Counter arguments against Grice
> Counter arguments in relation to Deceptions
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18