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Linguistic view/Field: assumes no meanings as mind-independent entities, but assigns words of a speaker to words of an interpreter. - The relations are based on different characteristics. - I.e. to inferences that contain this word - that's what I call "meaning-characteristic". - E.g.
Signification/Terminology/Field: here: Relations are signed - objects are denoted. - predicates signify their extension.
Definition Basis/Field: here: E.g. the basis for predicates whose extension depends on other predicates: - E.g. "rabbit", "dinosaur": depend on the basis: predicate "identical". - The functional dependency of the other predicates from the basic predicate "identical" allows the partial extensions of the predicate to be correlated with the partial extension of the others. - Definition dependent: is a predicate, if it has a basis. - Now we can define relevance. - Definition Relevance/Structure/Language/Gavagai/Field: a structure partially agrees with the semantics of O, iff a) each independent term t of L denoted or signified partially m(t) - b) each dependent term t of L denoted or signified m(t) with b(t) relative to the correlation of m(b(t)). - ((s) in b) not partial) - Still unsolved: how do we know which terms have a basis and which that is? - Problem: the words should also have a physical sense.
Definition "weak true"/truew/Field: "It is true that p" as equivalent to "p". - Definition "strongly true"/trues/Field: "It is true that p" as equivalent to "There is a certain fact that p". - Det-Operator/D/Field: "It is a certain fact that". - This cannot be explained with "true".
Definition Principle C/Conservativity/Field: Let A be a nominalistic formulated claim. - N: a corpus of such nominalistic assertions. - S a mathematical theory. A* is then not a consequence of N* + S if A is not itself a consequence of N* alone. - ((s) "A* only if A", that is, if A * is not determined yet, that any nominalistic formulation is sufficient).
Nominalization/Field: ... this suggests that laws about T (i.e., T obeying a particular differential equation) can be reformulated as laws over the relation between f and y. That is, ultimately the predicates Scal-Cong, St-Bet, Simul, S-Cong and perhaps Scal-Less.
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980