Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Geach, Peter T.
Books on Amazon
Terminology I 52
Two-Names-Theory/TNT/GeachVsAristoteles: false approximation of predication and naming: as if predicates were (complex) names: "on the mat") - ((s) E.g. "The person who stabbed Ceasar stabbed the one stabbed by Brutus"). - Geach: besides, a binding member would be needed. - Two-name-theory: "Socrates is a philosopher" is supposed to be true, because the same thing is named - Vs: "philosopher" (general term) is not a name for "all (or any) philosopher".
I 54
Two-Classes-Theory/TCT/GeachVs: even worse than Two-Name-Theory: the general term "philosopher" means "class of philosophers" - Socrates is then only a part of the class. Vs: The element-relation is quite different from the subclass-relation: E.g. a parliamentary committee is not a member of Parliament. - But: "is a philosopher" means exactly the same in both applications. - copula: fallacy of division: as if there were two varieties of "is": one for "is a philosopher," and one for "is an element of the class of philosophers" - Geach: equivalent sentences need not be able to be divided into equivalent sub-sets - "every logician" is not equivalent to "class of logicians".
I 122
Latin prose theory/Geach: the relative pronoun is treated as a connection of a binding word with a bound pronoun: "the" is translated as "so that": E.g. the king sent emissaries to make them ask for peace - e.g.(Bach-Peters phrases) solution : A boy kissed a girl, and she really loved him, but he was only pretending (this is still ambiguous) - but solution: e.g. Every true Englishman reveres __ above all ... and __ is his queen.
I 239
Predicate/Terminology/Geach: I only name predicates like this if they are used as the principal functor in a proposition, otherwise "predicables" - I-predicables/I-predicate/Geach: (s): those predicates which are indistinguishable with respect to the two objects in a given theory - If distinctions can be made in an extended theory, the I-predicate does not change its meaning, it is no longer an I-predicate. - e.g. "uniform" for (different, but not yet differentiated) tokens of words, later tokens are distinguished, but still "uniform".
I 245
"Surman"/Geach: (should be identical, if they have the same family name) are not counted twice - because in different theories differently provided with predicates - and thus counted differently. - ((s) identified as different by the theory.) - e.g. applicable in the universe with the same right: "is the same token as ..", "is the same type as ... "- "is the same lexicon entry as...".
I 250
Ascription theory/Geach: Vs "acts of will": attribution of responsibility instead of causality (GeachVs) - Oxford: Thesis: to say that an action is willful is not a description of the action but an attribution.
I 291
GeachVsAristoteles: Vs "Two-Name-Theory"/TNT: confuses the relation of names to named with the relation of the predicate to from what it is said. -> false doctrine of the Trinity.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-23