## Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments | |||

Author | Item | Excerpt | Meta data |
---|---|---|---|

Wright, Crispin Books on Amazon |
Terminology | I 41 "Platitude"/Wright: "P" is true if and only if "P" corresponds with the facts correspondence platitude Correspondence platitude/CP/Wright: "P" is true if and only if things are as "P" says that they are - Deflationism/Wright: accepts (like us) following platitudes: claiming something means, representing something as true, any truth enabled content has a meaningful negation, to be true means to correspond with the facts, a statement can be justified without being true, and vice versa. --- I 60 Epistemic Constraint/EC: if P is true, then there is evidence for that -> enforces revision of logic, otherwise P cannot be true if there is no evidence. --- I 99 Platitudes: are called so because they are intended to help preventing a weighty metaphysical realm. --- I 108 ~ Definition evidence transcendence: the presence of decidable parameter does not have to ensure that the answer to the question is equally decidable. --- I 115 Error theory: Mackie (ethics), Field (mathematics). Everything would have to be traced back to a metaphysical realm to make it true. But there is no metaphysical realm. --- A propos I 115 ~ Error theory/elsewhere: a theory that seeks to explain why our intuitions are different than the theory asserts. --- I 118ff Convergence 1: weak: only trend - more: Convergence 2: enforces convergence - Definition minimal capacity for truth: requires use of standards for assertibility and thus the existence of criteria - Vs "appropriate circumstances" unclear - VsWright: discourse about the strange: not minimal capable of truth. - WrightVs: there are no "permissive conditions" - Convergence platitude/representation platitude/Wright: divergent output can only be explained by divergent input - Definition cognitive coercion: a discourse enforces cognitive coercion if divergences can only be explained by divergent input - Tradition: moral discourse does not satisfy the criteria of cognitive coercion - Wright: but cognitive coercion is compatible with flexible standards, it is an additional condition for minimal truth-capable discourses. --- I 138 Wright pro convergence also in the discourse about the strange. --- I 150 Solidification/Wright: a solidification will change the modal status. Whether P is true, may be contingent, but if P is true, the statement is necessary that P is actually true. - Problem: this should not apply for the basic equation for shape - Another problem: "if S would be in the same circumstances, it would judge equally": if too much remains still valid in other possible worlds, the equation would be true in all possible worlds and the distinction gets questionable. |
Wri I Cr. Wright Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 |

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-28