Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Quine, Willard Van Orman
Books on Amazon
Theories I 34
Theory does not have to be based on intention, it was internalized in the past.
I 56
QuineVsVerification: it is pointless to equate a sentence within the theory with one outside - Inter-theoretically no meaning - no additions with "or" (>Goodman, Davidson, "fake theories") (where?).
I 57
For the time being, we retain our beliefs in theory creation.
I 74
Theory: Carnap: Terms - Quine: sentences.
I 393
Theory is only predication, universal quantification, truth function (for derived properties) - general term (for primary properties) - (no "because").
I 429
Theory: are isolated systems, mass point, infinitesimal size: behavior in every case more typical, the closer you get to zero, therefore it is acceptable - but not allowed in ontology - unlike geometric object: Position of mass points made no sense - therefore not individuateable. no identity. > §52.
I 431
Paraphrase (no synonymy): Newton could be reformulated relativistically - like Church: "true in a higher sense" - sometimes acceptable.
I 432
Theory: Structure of meaning, not choice of objects (Ramsey, Russell) Quine: new: even with physical objects they are also theoretical - Reason: sentences are semantically primary.
II 45
Equivalence of theories: is discovered when one discovers the possibility of reinterpretation - both true - but possibly logically incompatible.
VI 134
Theory/Empirically equivalent/logically equivalent/Quine: Two theories can be logically incompatible and yet empirically equivalent. E.g. Riemann/Euclidean geometry - Case 1: even untransformable theories (in the same terminology, where each implies certain sentences that the other one does not imply) are empirically equivalent - no problem - Case 2: additional theoretical terms - Case 3: logically incompatible - Davidson: can be traced back to case 2 - because contentious sentences depend on theoretical terms which are not empirical - therefore they are still empirically equivalent - Solution: theoretical term in question in two spellings (according to theory) - that makes them logically compatible.
VI 136
Empirically equivalent/logically incompatible/Theory/Quine: Case 2: (theory for global worlds without context embedding): - solution: eliminate exotic terms (without predictive power) - Important argument: then it is about consistency (otherwise QuineVsConsistency theory) - Elimination: justified by the fact that we have no other access to the truth except our own theory.
VI 139
Empirically equivalent/logically incompatible/Theory/Quine: Variant/Davidson: Both theories are valid, truth predicate: in comprehensive, neutral language - QuineVsDavidson: how much further should the variables reach then? - We need a stop, because we do not want a third theory - "everything different"/Important argument: the two systems definitely describe the same world - purely verbal question.
XII 70
Theory form/Quine: after abstraction of the meanings of the non-logical vocabulary and the value range of the variables - reinterpretation of the theory form provides models.

W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

> Counter arguments against Quine
> Counter arguments in relation to Theories

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-27