Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Searle, John R.
 
Books on Amazon
Animals I 137f
Bat: Problem: How it feels for the bat, not how it feels for us! - Properties: which exist, not: what we know about them - Epistemology/Ontology - First-person properties unlike third-person properties- full neurophysiological theory is not enough, no sensation.
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Perler/Wild I 132
Animal/Searle: Thesis: many animal species have consciousness, intentionality, thought processes.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-30