Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Fodor, Jerry
 
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Token-Physicalism I 137
Token physicalism/Fodor: 1) weaker than materialism: - Def materialism/Fodor: asserts both that the token ph. is true and that every event falls under the laws of one or another science-" (so you can be token physicalist without being a materialist) - 2) The token ph is weaker than the Def type ph./Fodor: any property that is mentioned in the laws of any science, is a physical property - token ph. does not include type ph, because the contingent identity of an event pair probably does not guarantee the identity of the properties whose instantiation constitutes the events, not even if the event identity is nomologically necessary. - I 138 If, on the other hand, every event is the instantiation of a property, then the type phys includes the token phys.: - two properties will be identical when they exist in the instantiation of the same property through the same ED at the same time - 3) token physicalism is weaker than the reductionism -

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-30