Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Aboutness, being about philosophy: The context in which this expression occurs is the reference to a linguistic expression on something beyond its linguistic level. The being-about-something makes a decisive step that distinguishes objects from everything else. Objects cannot be about something. In this sense, also individual words are to be understood as objects. In a wider sense, actions can also be about something. See also intentionality, intentions, reference, self-reference, levels, description levels, pointing, circularity, subsententials._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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P.F. Strawson on Aboutness - Dictionary of Arguments
I 185 Object/Activity /about/represent/stand for/singular term/predicate/StrawsonVsGeach: "about" can not be used to distinguish between singular term and predicate. E.g. Raleigh smokes can be regarded as a sentence on smoking. It also "stands for" specifies no singular term - Both singular term and predicate term can stand for something. VsGeach: Geach is forced to say that "smoking" stands for something because for him predicative expressions stand for properties. >Predication/Geach, >Predicate/Geach, >Singular terms, >Predicates, >Levels/order. >Properties/Geach, >Intentionality._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18