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Untranslatable/Translation/Extension/Deflationism/Field: Problem: Incorporation of untranslatable sentences. - solution potential extension of one's own language by accepting truth-preservation in conclusion.
Names by Index: "Georg-i": the George, to which Mary refered at the occasion of Z.
Pro sentence theory: "UTT Guru, Z": the sentence the Guru uttered at Z. - The special sentence is then superfluous.
Disquotational truth: Problem: untranslatable sentences are not disquotational true.
Definition quasi-translation/Definition quasi-meaning/FieldVsChurch/FieldVsSchiffer/Field: this is what most understand as meaning. - Not literal translation but reproduction as the interpreter understands the use of the corresponding words in his own language at the point of time in his actual world. - Comparison: is preserved in the quasi-translation at the moment, not in a literal translation.
Sententialism/Sententionalism/Field: Thesis: If we say that someone says that snow is white, we express a relation between the person and the sentence. - 1. Quasi-translation and quasi-meaning instead of literal. - 2. "La neige est blanche" quasi-means the same as #Snow is white# - (#) what stands between #, should be further translated (quasi-). - In quasi-translation, the quasi-meaning is preserved.
Translation/Parameter/Field: in many cases, the relativization of the translation to a parameter is necessary to make it recognizable as a translation. - E.g. "finite": the non-standard argument tells us that there are strange models, so that "is in the extension of "finite" in M" functions as a "translation" of "finite" which maintains the inferential role of all what we say in pure mathematics.
- N.B.: "Is in the extension of "finite" in M" is a parameterized expression. - Solution: what we are doing is to "translate" the one-digit predicate "finite" into the two-digit predicate "is in the extension of "finite" in x", along with the statements to determine the value of x on a model M with the necessary characteristics.
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980