Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Belief, philosophy: attitude of considering a sentence to be true. Unlike religious faith belief is linked to the assessment of probabilities. A belief is an attitude of a thinking person which can usually be formulated in a sentence, whereby the person must be able to integrate the sentence into a set of further sentences. A further condition is that the bearer of beliefs is able to reformulate the corresponding sentences and negate them, that is, to grasp their meaning. See also religious belief, propositional attitudes, intensions, probability, belief degrees, private language._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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D. Lewis on Belief - Dictionary of Arguments
V 151 Belief/Perry: always has two objects. - 1st object: Pair of individual and property - (propositional belief: would be a zero-digit relation) - Belief/Perry: not inside the head - Heimson and Hume are the same inside the head - but different pairs of individual and property - problem: then madness would lie in the states of the world - solution/Perry: the first object of Heimson is incorrect - 2nd object: a function with the subject as an argument and the first object (individual-property pair) as a value - according to the 2nd object, beliefs are indeed inside my head - Hume and Heimson have the same 2nd object: the function Hume attributes to the pair Hume and the property to be Hume - both believe the same thing. - Lewis pro. --- IV 152 Belief/LewisVsPutnam: is inside the head. - The self-attribution of the subject is the whole of its belief system - external ascriptions are no other belief attitudes - on the other hand: belief de re: is not inside the head - is not a real belief either - they are facts by virtue of the relation of belief in the things. >de re/Lewis. IV 153 Belief de re/Lewis: not de re: E.g. the attribution of "is a spy" to "smallest spy" ... - E.g. not de re: the attribution "murderer" when the murder is not yet resolved - appropriate descriptions would single out the essence - not de re: E.g. somebody gave me ... IV 155 Solution: acquaintance - E.g. "the man of whom I've heard by the name of Hume ..." is already an acquaintance. - Also: E.g. the driver of the car in front of me - unknown entity is irrelevant. >Acquaintance. --- Schwarz I 179 Belief/Dogma/semantics/LewisVsStalnaker: whether a player knows the best move does not depend on him if he considers the sentence "this is the best move" to be true - he does not have to speak any language - (omniscience/Stalnaker: actual ignorance in apparent ignorance of necessary truth always involves linguistic state of affairs._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18