Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Belief, philosophy: attitude of considering a sentence to be true. Unlike religious faith belief is linked to the assessment of probabilities. See also belief, religious belief, propositional attitudes, intensions, probability, belief degrees.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Lewis, David
Books on Amazon
Beliefs V 151
Belief/Perry: always has two objects. - 1st object: Pair of individual and property - (propositional belief: would be a zero-digit relation) - Belief/Perry: not inside the head - Heimson and Hume are the same inside the head - but different pairs of individual and property - problem: then madness would lie in the states of the world - solution/Perry: the first object of Heimson is incorrect - 2nd object: a function with the subject as an argument and the first object (individual-property pair) as a value - according to the 2nd object, beliefs are indeed inside my head - Hume and Heimson have the same 2nd object: the function Hume attributes to the pair Hume and the property to be Hume - both believe the same thing. - Lewis pro.
IV 152
Belief/LewisVsPutnam: is inside the head. - The self-attribution of the subject is the whole of its belief system - external ascriptions are no other belief attitudes - on the other hand: belief de re: is not inside the head - is not a real belief either - they are facts by virtue of the relation of belief in the things.
IV 153
Belief de re/Lewis: not de re: E.g. the attribution of "is a spy" to "smallest spy" ... - E.g. not de re: the attribution "murderer" when the murder is not yet resolved - appropriate descriptions would single out the essence - not de re: E.g. somebody gave me ...
IV 155
Solution: acquaintance - E.g. "the man of whom I've heard by the name of Hume ..." is already an acquaintance. - Also: E.g. the driver of the car in front of me - unknown entity is irrelevant.
Schw I 179
Belief/Dogma/semantics/LewisVsStalnaker: whether a player knows the best move does not depend on him if he considers the sentence "this is the best move" to be true - he does not have to speak any language - (omniscience/Stalnaker: actual ignorance in apparent ignorance of necessary truth always involves linguistic state of affairs.

D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-23