|Belief, philosophy: attitude of considering a sentence to be true. Unlike religious faith belief is linked to the assessment of probabilities. See also belief, religious belief, propositional attitudes, intensions, probability, belief degrees.|
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|Beliefs||Schiffer I 19
Belief/Loar: is understood as a function that depicts propositions on internal physical states. - These internal physical states have functional roles that are specified by these propositions.
Belief/SchifferVsLoar: Problem: his realization of a theory of beliefs/desires - (as a function of propositions on physical states), whose functional roles are defined by the theory. - Problem: to find a theory that correlates each proposition with a single functional role rather than many roles. - Schiffer: this will not work, therefore the Quine-Field argument is done in.
Quine-Field Argument/Schiffer: (I 157) Belief/Beliefs/Quine/Schiffer: for Quine, beliefs are never true, although he concedes Quine pro Brentano: ~ you cannot break out of the intentional vocabulary. But:
QuineVsBrentano: ~ the canonical scheme includes no propositional attitudes, only physical constitution and behavior of organisms.
Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987