Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Search  
 
Belief, philosophy: attitude of considering a sentence to be true. Unlike religious faith belief is linked to the assessment of probabilities. See also belief, religious belief, propositional attitudes, intensions, probability, belief degrees.
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Loar, Brian
 
Books on Amazon
Beliefs Schiffer I 19
Belief/Loar: is understood as a function that depicts propositions on internal physical states. - These internal physical states have functional roles that are specified by these propositions.
I 286f
Belief/SchifferVsLoar: Problem: his realization of a theory of beliefs/desires - (as a function of propositions on physical states), whose functional roles are defined by the theory. - Problem: to find a theory that correlates each proposition with a single functional role rather than many roles. - Schiffer: this will not work, therefore the Quine-Field argument is done in.
Quine-Field Argument/Schiffer: (I 157) Belief/Beliefs/Quine/Schiffer: for Quine, beliefs are never true, although he concedes Quine pro Brentano: ~ you cannot break out of the intentional vocabulary. But:
QuineVsBrentano: ~ the canonical scheme includes no propositional attitudes, only physical constitution and behavior of organisms.

Loar I
B. Loar
Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987


> Counter arguments against Loar



back to list view | > Suggest your own contribution | > Suggest a correction
 
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-24