Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Belief, philosophy: attitude of considering a sentence to be true. Unlike religious faith belief is linked to the assessment of probabilities. See also belief, religious belief, propositional attitudes, intensions, probability, belief degrees.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
McDowell, John
Books on Amazon
Beliefs I 168
Belief/McDowellVsDavidson: He could also have said: nothing is conceivable as a reason for a belief if it is not also located in the space of reasons, such as the fact that it seems to a subject to be this and that.
Of course it is not the same, whether something seems to me to be this and that or if I am convinced that it is so.
I 192
McDowellVsPeacocke: ... that is not proof that the non-conceptual content is conceivable as the reason for a subject to be convinced of something.
The subject may not even have reasons.
Example: the experienced cyclist makes the right movements without the need for reasons. The description does not require reasons either.
I 193
McDowellVsEvans, McDowellVsPeacocke: this neither justifies the assumption that judgments and beliefs are founded in experience, nor that beliefs are founded by experience "as reasons".
Experience/World/McDowell: the condition of correctness is that the object is actually square.
Rorty VI 179
McDowellVsSellars/Rorty: beliefs can also be justified by mental processes that are different from judgments.

J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-30