Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Belief, philosophy: attitude of considering a sentence to be true. Unlike religious faith belief is linked to the assessment of probabilities. See also belief, religious belief, propositional attitudes, intensions, probability, belief degrees.
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Nozick, Robert
 
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Beliefs II 174f
Truth/Belief/Knowledge/Nozick: four conditions: (1) p is true - (2) S believes that p - (3) If p were not true, S would not believe p. - (4) If p > S believes that p - improvement: if p were true, S would believe it. - That excludes the following: someone happens to look into a book and therefore believes p, but would otherwise not believe it. - Problem: you can believe something according to one method, and not believe the same thing according to another method.
II 180
Problem: Variant: truth or falsity of p affects the choice of method.
II 178
Trace: = connection to the fact: is given when a person fulfils (3) and (4). - (3) ensures the trace.
II 179ff
Belief/Truth/Nozick: assuming, there are different methods, and the belief depends on the method. - E.g. The grandmother sees her grandson and believes that he is doing well. - If he were dead, you'd also tell her he was fine. - It does not follow that when she sees him, she does not know that he is doing well. - E.g. A father believes that his son is innocent. - a) out of love - b) because of the evidence - Problem: if the choice of method depends on the truth/falsity - that a method fulfils conditions 1 - 4 is too strong, that it only fulfils one, too weak.
II 236
Belief/Knowledge/Disjunction/Conjunction/Probability/Nozick: Conjunction: we can believe it with connection to only one - disjunction: here we need both. - Adjunction: from the premises p, q, we can conclude the conjunction p & q as conclusion.
Probability: here, adjunction may fail, because the conjunction of two premises has a lower probability than each one individually. - Universal Generalization/Existence Generalization: we can believe it without connection to a particular instance.

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-24