Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Belief, philosophy: attitude of considering a sentence to be true. Unlike religious faith belief is linked to the assessment of probabilities. A belief is an attitude of a thinking person which can usually be formulated in a sentence, whereby the person must be able to integrate the sentence into a set of further sentences. A further condition is that the bearer of beliefs is able to reformulate the corresponding sentences and negate them, that is, to grasp their meaning. See also religious belief, propositional attitudes, intensions, probability, belief degrees, private language._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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A. Prior on Belief - Dictionary of Arguments
Cresswell II 146 Belief/Prior/Cresswell: Thesis: Belief should not be considered a predicate of that-sentence - but instead believes-that should be seen as a syntactic unit that is applied directly to a sentence. Cf. >That-sentences, >Predicates, >Beliefs, >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief. - - - Prior I 6f Belief/Prior: no adequate approach without distinction between mind state of belief and that which is believed (state/content). >Belief state/Perry, >Mind state. Prior: in case of false beliefs: instead of non-existing object: attribution: E.g. Othello attributes infidelity to Desdemona. >`Attribution, >Predication, >Non-existence. PriorVsRussell: Problem: above it is abstract loyalty. >Abstract objects, >Abstractness. In case of falsity, the belief relation would then need to have an additional position (to the true fact). >Relation theory. I 11 False Belief/Russell: false facts fail in truth-making. >Truthmakers, >Facts. Montague: points in the wrong direction. >R. Montague. PriorVs: not for a neutral observer. >Intentionality, >Thinking. I 27 Belief/Prior: belief is no relation - E.g. ...that nothing is perfect: there is no object. >Generality, >Generalization. I 53 Belief Function/Prior: E.g. X believes that ... is not identical in identical propositions: e.g. ...is a bachelor/...is an unmarried man. although one may feel that the propositions are self-identical. I 81 Belief/Prior: you do not have to believe rightly that you believe something. >about/Prior) You can also simultaneously believe p and not-p. You can believe something contradictory. E.g. the fear that God will punish you for your disbelief. >Thinking, >Logic. You can find out that you did not believe what was thought you believed. - If someone believes what he says when he says that he mistakenly believes that it is raining, then this belief is not necessarily mistaken. >Error, >Deception, >Falsehood, >Levels/order, >Description levels. No epistemic logic ist necessary, propositional calculus is sufficient. >Epistemic logic, >Propositional calculus._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19