Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Belief, philosophy: attitude of considering a sentence to be true. Unlike religious faith belief is linked to the assessment of probabilities. See also belief, religious belief, propositional attitudes, intensions, probability, belief degrees.
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Prior, Arthur
 
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Beliefs Cresswell II 146
Belief/Prior/Cresswell: Thesis: Belief should not be considered a predicate of that-sentence - but instead believes-that should be seen as a syntactic unit that is applied directly to a sentence.
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Prior I 6f
Belief/Prior: no adequate approach without distinction between mind state of belief and that which is believed (state/content) - in case of false beliefs: instead of non-existing object: attribution: E.g. Othello attributes infidelity to Desdemona - PriorVsRussell: Problem: above it is abstract loyalty. - In case of falsity, the belief relation would then need to have an additional position (to the true fact).
I 11
False Belief/Russell: false facts fail in truth-making. - Montague: points in the wrong direction. - PriorVs: not for a neutral observer.
I 27
Belief/Prior: no relation - E.g. ...that nothing is perfect: no object.
I 53
Belief Function/Prior: E.g. X believes that ... not identical in identical propositions: bachelor/unmarried man - (although one may feel that the propositions are self-identical).
I 81
Belief/Prior: you do not have to believe rightly that you believe something - (>about) - you can also simultaneously believe p and not-p. - You can believe something contradictory - E.g. fear that God will punish you for your disbelief. - You can find out that you did not believe what was thought you believed - If someone believes what he says when he says that he mistakenly believes that it is raining, then this belief is not necessarily mistaken. - No epistemic logic ist necessary, propositional calculus is sufficient.

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-25