Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Belief, philosophy: attitude of considering a sentence to be true. Unlike religious faith belief is linked to the assessment of probabilities. See also belief, religious belief, propositional attitudes, intensions, probability, belief degrees.
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Rorty, Richard
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
Beliefs III 84
Beliefs/Rorty: a belief that can be justified before anyone is not interesting for anybody! The traditional distinction between "rational conviction" and "belief, which is brought about by causes rather than reasons" should be abolished! In the end, the replacement of vocabularies is what counts and not of beliefs! The replacement of truth value candidates, not the determination of a truth value.
III 89
Belief/Rorty: a belief that could be justified to anyone would interest no one. - III 90 In the end, the replacement of vocabularies is what counts and not of beliefs! - The replacement of truth value candidates, not the determination of a truth value.
VI 63ff (where?)
Truth/Rorty: there is no cause of the truth of beliefs.
VI 144
Belief/existence/Dennett/Rorty: sometimes you do not accept the existence of an entity, but concede that we must have faith in this entity. E.g. belief in qualia and the phenomenological.
VI 187
Belief/Davidson: thesis: most of our beliefs must be true - beliefs are no more or less accurate representations, but they are states that are attributed to people for the purpose of explaining their behavior. - One cannot determine first the belief and then its cause, but rather the reverse. - Rorty: (like Davidson) we are interested in the beliefs of the others, because we want to be able to deal with their behavior.
VI 214
Beliefs/Davidson/Sellars/Brandom/Rorty: are imposed on us by the world, and that happens in the course of causal interactions between the program forced upon us in the educational process and the sensual organs. - (DavidsonVsMcDowell).
VI 231
Belief/Davidson/Rorty: self-attribution of experiences presuppose the self-attribution of intentional states. - That’s only possible for someone who already believes many true things of about the world. - That is about the causal link between beliefs and world.
VI 233
Belief/Davidson. we can only know the content of our intentional states if we know about their causes. - (Causality) - M. WilliamsVsDavidson: this is just the foundation thought that he rejects.
VI 426f
Belief/experience/Rorty: the spirit of the adult is more complex than that of the child. - Thus, the distinction between causation and justification of beliefs disappears. - (> Davidson)

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-23