|Belief, philosophy: attitude of considering a sentence to be true. Unlike religious faith belief is linked to the assessment of probabilities. See also belief, religious belief, propositional attitudes, intensions, probability, belief degrees.|
Books on Amazon
Definition subdoxastic/Stich: (1978): a subdoxastic state is not a religious state, but an information-bearing state. You are unconscious and inferentially insulated from beliefs. E.g. if there is a transformational grammar, then the states they would represent would be subdoxastic. - Schiffer: language processing is done through a series of internal subdoxastic states.
Belief/Schiffer: problem: so a psychological theory does not create the meaning believes - solution: > psycho functionalism. - Functionalist reduction. Ultimately: "Bel = def 1 element of an ordered pair of functions that satisfies T (f,g) "... ((s) from which the theory says that it is belief) ...) - ((s) "Loar-style").
It is already presupposed that they form beliefs and desires as functions of propositions on (sets of) internal Z-types - the criterion that a Z-token is n a belief, that p is, that n is a token of a Z-type which has the functional role, that correlates the definition of bel T with p.
Belief property/SchifferVs: if they existed, they would not be irreducible (absurd) - ((s) It is already proven for Schiffer that there is a neural proposition for E.g. stepping back from a car.) - This is the cause - then mental proposition in addition. - This is then not supported by any counterfactual conditional - counterfactual conditional/(s): indicates whether something is superfluous - or whether it is then sufficient as an explanation.
Belief properties/Schiffer: presumed they existed (language-independent), then they should be simple (non-assembled) - i.e. no function of other things. - Vs: E.g. the proposition, to love Thatcher is composed of love and Thatcher - but belief is no such relation (see above). - Problem: if belief properties are semantically simple, then there is an infinite number of them. - Then language learning is impossible.
Belief predicates: less problematic than belief properties: irreducibility out of conceptual role.- E.g. Ava would not have stepped back if she did not have the belief property that a car is coming - conceptually and ontologically independent of the singular term "The EC of the belief that a car comes" - (benign predicate-dualism (in terms of conceptual roles). - has no causal power - pleonastic: Ava stepped back because she had the belief property...
Belief: (s) Where, Ava believes that a car is coming, she believes this in every possible world that is physically indistinguishable from the actual world. - Problem: that cannot be proven - but is probably true. - Then ultimately, she stepped back, because she was in the neural state... - SchifferVsEliminativisms/SchifferVsChurchland: should then have the result that nobody believes anything.
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987