Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Belief, philosophy: attitude of considering a sentence to be true. Unlike religious faith belief is linked to the assessment of probabilities. See also belief, religious belief, propositional attitudes, intensions, probability, belief degrees.
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Stalnaker, Robert
 
Books on Amazon
Beliefs I 54
Belief/faith /objective/Lewis/Stalnaker: according to Lewis all objective impersonal beliefs are beliefs about what is in reality, and not about the place of the believer in the world. - Either necessarily true or necessarily false. - But these do not express anything.
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Schiffer I 46
Belief / Stalnaker/Schiffer: with content "x believes that dogs have fleas" - without content: x is a belief.
Stalnaker/Stampe: counterfactual: x believes p iff. x is in a brain state, that x would not be in under optimal conditions, if it were not the case that p.
Representation/Dretske: fuel gauge: is a reliable indicator (> reliability) - by regularity for the representation.
SchifferVs: problem: if the condition is never met - Conclusion: if propositions are belief objects, then the theory is never functionalist ((s) if it is intended to be non-mentalistic).

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-30