Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Circumstances, philosophy: the concept of circumstances is relevant in the context of observations which are intended to confirm or disprove a hypothesis within an assumed theory. What belongs to the relevant circumstances is determined by the theory. See also situations, states, conditions, theories, ceteris paribus, experiments, observation, theoretical terms, theoretical entities, relevance, significance._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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S.A. Kripke on Circumstances - Dictionary of Arguments
I 119 Circumstances/conditions: are there really circumstances under which Hesperus would not have been Phosphorus? E.g. suppose someone comes along, and he/she names two different stars Hesperus. >Morning star/Evening star. That could even happen if the same conditions prevail as when both names were introduced by us. But are they conditions under which Hesperus is not Phosphorus or would not have been Phosphorus? That does not seem to be the case. >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Speaker reference._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984 |