|Quine, Willard Van Orman
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|Inscrutability of reference||II 33
Inscrutability of reference: no difference: x is a dog or: x is the Rï· Zï· strand that is filled by a dog. - Only Statement about the terminology used and its translation, not about physical objects (representative function). -Inscrutability: In translation or permutation.
Analytical hypothesis/Translation manual/Quine: term by term translation. - Problem: then meaningful sentences may arise which refer to something else. - This is the inscrutability of reference.
Inscrutability/Reference/Quine: goes much deeper than indeterminacy of translation: even within a language, even if apparatus of individuation (plural, pronoun, identity, quantification, etc.) is assumed to be fixed. - E.g. protosyntax: (only strings of signs of one type (1st stage) - in that case, expressions are always types, not tokens.
ad XII 64
Non-factualism/(s): if something is indeterminate in principle, then there is no fact to explore. - Quine: e.g. if meaning is a property of the behavior, the inscrutability of reference cannot lie in the inscrutability of a fact - because there is nothing to investigate. - But it probably makes a difference whether one refers to rabbits or parts, - or e.g. to the formulas or Gödel numbers. - Because then there would be no difference between them. - Reference would lose its meaning. - But the difference is not tangible, neither through the behavior nor through ostension. -> Indeterminacy. - Formulas: have different properties than numbers.
Reversed spectra/Inscrutability/Quine: corresponds to the problem rabbit/part (Gavagai). - Only that there is no frame of reference (apparatus of individuation). - Can never be found out. - Things are reversed, properties are retained. - ((s) things do not change sides, properties).
Pointing/Ontological relativity/Inscrutability/Quine: you cannot point to absolute location or speed. -Just as you cannot point to rabbits or parts. (> Gavagai).
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953
Bezeichnung und Referenz
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003