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Universals/Armstrong: must be instantiated, but not necessarily now: Def Universal/Armstrong: the repeatable properties of the spatio-temporal world - false: to every general predicate corresponds a universal: then also uninstantiated universals (ArmstrongVs) - what universals there are is not semantically (a priori) determined - but a posteriori: from discovery - no disjunctive or negative universals - but certainly conjunctive and complex ones.
Stages/Levels/Universals/Particulars/Armstrong: 1st order universals: Relation, 2nd order: Necessity? - 2nd order individuals: = 1st order universals - State: E.g. Fa or aRb. Likewise, N(F,G) - 1st order: aRb. includes 1st order individuals covered by a 1st order universal (relation) - 2nd order: N(F,G) involves 2nd order individuals (namely 1st order universals!) covered by a 2nd order universal.
Principle of Invariance of the Orders: when a U of stage M is in an instantiation, it is of the stage M in all instantiations.
Universals/Armstrong: there can be no uninstatiated universals - VsTooley: his e.g. with a particle that reacts idiosyncratically with all others with an unknown simple property emerging, which never happens, makes in this case a single uiU necessary as truth-maker, because the contents of the corresponding law is completely unknown.
UiU logically possible, but disaster for theory of universals: can then not be excluded that none are instantiated at all and they still exist (>Plato) - possible solution: deny that there are absolutely simple U (s) because of simple emerging properties) - Armstrong: I do not want that - I do not know if they exist.
Universals/PlaceVsPlato: instead of shared properties in the case of similarity of several individuals: property is a criterion of attribution of instances - the kind of "property" has an instance - Place pro universals in this sense.
MartinVsArmstrong: not "distributed existence" of the universal across different and interrupted instantiations - truth maker of counterfactual conditionals is the single instantiation, not a consistent universal between the instantiations - otherwise, he must be a realist in terms of forces and trends "in" the properties.
"Busy World"/MartinVsArmstrong: the obvious possibility that a single U instantiation lasts only briefly, makes it logically necessary that other individuals exist that hold the manifestations distributed throughout the spacetime together - but it seems obvious that the world does not have to be so busy - solution: thesis of truth maker is the individual instantiation itself -> 96 II, II 102.
Universals/MartinVsArmstrong: the fact that it is supposed to be the same counts little as long as the relation may still be necessary or contingent.
Universals/MartinVsArmstrong: mysterious: the numerically identical U is nothing more than and consists only in the numerically different and non-identical instantiations.
AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983