Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Quine, Willard Van Orman
Books on Amazon
Universals I 72
Disposition: stimulus is here no single event, but universal. Not two similar ones, but repetition of the same.
Universal: the same, not two of a kind! -> Disposition and conjunctive make universals indispensable.
Unrealized entities: universals - not individual things. (otherwise infinite classes of duplicates)> possible world.
I 102
Goodman: "Rabbitness": is a discontinuous space-time segment, which consists of rabbits.
I 286
Intensional abstraction: "dogness", "cake baking", "erring".
I 332
Sentence = universal - Value of the variable: Proposition (object) - remains intact even after singular term - Proposition resists change of the truth value - Proposition remains nameless in "x0p".
I 414
Object: accept that what singular terms denotes as values ​​- (But singular term eliminated!) - E.g. "glimmer", but not "glimmeriness".
I 423
Unrealized possibilities: the various possible hotels at the corner: no identity by position! - At most as universals.
II 220
Universals/Quine: must be included in ontology: E.g. some zoological species are mutually fertile - Frege’s ancestors - Kaplan: "Some critics admire nobody but each other".
Numbers, functions (also in physics).
VII 10~
Universals/Names/Quine: tradition cannot argue that predicates such as "red" would have to be the name of universals: being a name is much more special than having a meaning - "Pegasizes" is not an attribute (Universal) but a predicate (term).
VII 73
Universals/Quine: E.g. "Red": is the biggest red thing in the universe - even if it is distributed - E.g. income groups: each is a thing distributed in space and time which consists of various stages of different people - problem: distinction between spatio-temporal and conceptual distribution: E.g. graphic figure can be interpreted as consisting of more or less numerous triangles or squares - that is why universals are no concrete facts.
VII 75
Universals/Quine: must be accepted as abstract entities, because names must always be substitutable (Frege, substitution principle).
VII 117
Universals/Quine: a theory which deals only with objects can be rephrased in a way that it refers to universals - E.g. length of bodies instead of bodies - e.g. concrete: Inscription - abstract: notational form.

W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

> Counter arguments against Quine
> Counter arguments in relation to Universals

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-28