|Quine, Willard Van Orman
Books on Amazon
|Underdetermination||X 25 ~
Underdetermination/Empiricism/Quine: also through unmonitored data.
Underdetermination/Identity of theories/Quine/Lauener: theories: can be logically incompatible and empirically equivalent - E.g. interchanging -electron/molecule-: makes true sentences false - "since the change is purely terminological, you can say that both versions express the same theory -" so they are empirically equivalent -" however, the predicates can be reconstructed in a way that the theories also become logically equivalent - E.g. empirically equivalent: Theory a) space infinite -" b) finite, objects shrink with distance from the center -" Again, the predicates can be rephrased in such a way that the theories are logically equivalent -" underdetermination: In order to prove them, it would have to have an influence on the empirical content -" Quine: almost impossible to find an example.
Underdetermination/Quine/Lauener: there are rivals to every infinite theory that are equivalent empirically, but not logically, and that cannot be made logically equivalent by reconstructing the predicates.
Stroud I 217
Underdetermination/Theory/Theoretical terms/Entities/Quine/Stroud: the truths that the scientist introduces e.g. about molecules are not sufficiently determined by all the truths that he knows or can ever know about the normal objects -" (s) there could be several possible theories which imply the same set of truths about the normal objects, but differ in terms of the theoretical ones -" theoretical entities do not follow from the truths about normal things -" Quine/Stroud: for him, normal objects are also just hypotheses -" this is how all theories go beyond data -" underdetermination: also remains, if we included all past and future nervous stimuli of all people.
Problem: even true sentences go beyond the data, are projections - therefore they cannot be known.
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953
Bezeichnung und Referenz
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984