Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Causes: whether something is a physical cause of something depends on the separation of two objects or processes that are to be identified as cause and effect, as well as the transmission of energy. Whether this relationship comes about is therefore contingent. From a linguistic point of view, the relationship between cause and effect is a necessary relation since the concept of the cause is applied only to something which has an effect. See also de re, de dicto, necessity, contingency, causality, effect._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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D. Lewis on Causes - Dictionary of Arguments
V 159 Cause/Lewis: nowadays: cause can only be an indispensable part of something. - Never a whole. - A set of law propositions and a set of fact propositions must imply C>E together. - Where E is the proposition that e exists and C that c exists. - ((s) These are general statements.) --- V 167 Cause/Lewis: an event is the cause of another if there is a causal chain that leads from one to another. - Causal chain: we get it when we make a >causal dependency (which is not actually transitive) transitive. --- V 191f Cause/omission/Lewis: omission can be a cause. - For that we need a different kind of counterfactual conditionals - Sleep would also be an event in this case. - Difference: a) to assume an event as not given - b) thinking it away qua omission. --- V 201f Prevention/Cause/Lewis: problem: how can a preavious prevention be a cause? - (For the omission) - Solution: intermediate event between too early and too late. - So we distinguish the real cause from the prevented alternative - late prevention: is more difficult. - The prevention must come after the last alternative. - Lewis: That is not the way we see possible worlds. - Better: common sense. --- V 326 Backtracking: E.g. of concluding various causes from different effects. --- Schwarz I 139 Cause/causing/Armstrong: Absence is not a real cause. - LewisVsArmstrong: yes it is, but just so common that it is ignored. - Problem: in vacuum countless absences. --- I 140 Solution/Lewis: Absences are nothing, because there is nothing - problem: if absence were merely an empty time-space region, why is there oxygen without it and not nitrogen? -> Solution/Lewis: Impact, slight increase in probability. >Counterfactual dependence --- I 141 Counterfactual dependence: exists also between the how, when and where of the action._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-24