Books on Amazon
Utilitarianism/truth/Decision Theory/DT/D.H.Hodgson/Lewis: Problem: Utilitarism/Hodgson: assumes no truthfulness. - Then two players will not necessarily cooperate (prisoner’s dilemma with information about the behavior of the other person). - Instead, random selection seems just as rational. - Because due to rationality the assumption arises that the other one does not have to be truthful. - Because rationality has nothing to do with truthfulness. - Important argument: I have to show (manifest) that I have reason to believe you. - LevisVsHodgson: Solution: This only apllies if one is systematically untruthful. - Then you have reason to choose the opposite. - Otherwise common sense is enough to make the manifestation superfluous.
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989
Konventionen Berlin 1975
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991