Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Vagueness, philosophy: there are descriptions of objects or situations that are necessarily not fully determined. For example, the indication whether a given hue is still red or already orange is not always decidable. It is a property of the language to provide vague predicates. Whether vagueness is a property of the world is controversial. See also sorites, indeterminacy, under-determinateness, intensification, penumbra._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Cr Wright on Vagueness - Dictionary of Arguments
I 129f Color/vagueness/Wright: shades could be characterized as "accepted" the description as "vague". One could denote something as "red", without being obliged to it. But should one say then that this has both mandatory and permissive moves? Or should we rather conclude that it is wrong to speak of "borderline cases" that permit decisions, but do not prescribe anything? Def Vagueness: does not mean the existence of an "inbetween realm". Vagueness/Wright: is rather the fact that the contrast between what "red" prescribes and that what "not red" prescribes, is not clear everywhere. Also ambiguous shades contrast with unambiguous. ((s) WittgensteinVs, sorites). Vagueness/convergence/conditions/criteria/Wright: Could there not be a completely permissive discourse? It is clear that the contrast between conditions, that allow an assertion and such for which nothing applies, cannot be completely permissive itself. >Assertibility conditions, >Assertibility, >Truth conditions, >Facts. Otherwise, there could be no information without additional information. Nothing would be excluded by the "correctness" of such an information ("per se"). There would be nothing then in which this correctness could exist. --- II 226f Vagueness/sorites/Wright: the existence of borderline cases does not include blurred boundaries - blurred boundaries instead blurry in logical space. Frege/Russell: vagueness is a lack of our language. WrightVs: vague predicates merely partial functions. This is consistent with a sharp distinction between cases where applicable and where not. - There is no lack of instruction, but a demand that the borders are not drawn. Continuity of the world,... II 230 ...not a reflex of our mental weakness. >Continuity._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20