Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Behavior: Observable changes in the describable state of living organisms that are initiated by these organisms themselves or that represent a reaction to external stimuli where there is a certain choice of reaction. Accompanying thoughts are not part of behavior, as otherwise an arbitrary extension of the frame of reference would make it impossible to determine behavior. See also Actions, Behaviorism, Mentalism, Naturalism, Observation, Method, Frame theories._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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D.M. Armstrong on Behavior - Dictionary of Arguments
Avramides I 151 Behavior/Armstrong/Avramides: Behavior first has to mean: physical behavior. - Otherwise the concept is circular. In contrast: "actual behavior"/Armstrong: actual behavior also refers to the mind. >Mind, >Thinking, >Thoughts, >Dispositions, >Intentionality. Avramides I 157 Actual behavior is interpreted behavior that can be seen only by a subject in other subjects. >Subjects, >Interpretation. Avramides: Interpreted behavior is a per third-person viewpoint. It is no God's standpoint or neurophysiology. I 159 Then the mind cannot be only contingently connected to behavior. A subject can never be separated from his experience. However, the mind is without significant reference to behavior. >Experience, >Reference._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20