Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Verificationism, philosophy: verificationism is, in the narrower sense, the view that the meaning of statements consists through the method of their verification (their confirmation). It follows that statements which cannot be verified are ultimately meaningless. See also anti-realism, realism, empiricist sense criterion._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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R. Carnap on Verificationism - Dictionary of Arguments
Stroud I 199f Verificationism/Carnap: we cannot understand anything that cannot be proven true or false. - StroudVs: this failed, even as the attempt to pick out the empirically verifiable sentences. - Problem: verification methods and sentences that somehow involved "theory". - Or "inferred entities". - ((s)> Theoretical entities). Stroud: but our concepts and our minds are not so strictly tied to "sensory experience". - (VsLogical Positivism). >Positivism. Solution: verificationism would have had to explain how we confirm our belief by experience. - That did not work. Then skepticism would have been defeated. Verification principle (V.P.) and skepticism have the same problem. How our beliefs are empirically confirmed. >Confirmation. Skepticism is not refuted by the verification principle if we do not know if we are dreaming. >Skepticism._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg), Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |