Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Verificationism, philosophy: verificationism is, in the narrower sense, the view that the meaning of statements consists through the method of their verification (their confirmation). It follows that statements which cannot be verified are ultimately meaningless. See also anti-realism, realism, empiricist sense criterion._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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M. Dummett on Verificationism - Dictionary of Arguments
II 112ff Disjunction/Verification/Meaning Theory/Dummett: quite different than in the intuitionist logic: e.g. it was either an even or odd number of geese on the Capitol - should not have to guarantee that any one of the disjuncts can be verified - then the law of the excluded middle is assertible even if the sentence itself is undecidable. II 123 Verificationist Meaning Theory/Dummett: results from the assumption that we cannot have any concept of a fact that we cannot see - Important argument: then the non-occurrence of a non-discernible fact is not in itself another fact. -> anti-realism). - Then the fact that an assertion cannot be seen as neither correct nor incorrect is to be shown sufficiently that it can be neither correct nor incorrect - that only leads to bivalency in realism. II 126 Verific. Meaning Theory/Correctness/Realism/Anti-Realism/Dummett: a) Verificationist meaning theory: truth conditions visible: then two options: 1) assertion correct if shown that it is impossible to be incorrect - 2) incorrect, if not displayable as correct b) Realism: truth conditions not visible: then there is no difference, because the incorrectness conditions always exist if the correctness conditions do not exist, and vice versa - II 126 but even here incorrectness prevails. II 126 Verificationist Meaning Theory/Dummett: needs only effective, decidable concepts - (not realistic) - but neither classical nor intuitionistic logic! II 126 Meaning Theory/Verification/Logical Form/Dummett: double negation: ~~A l- A and l-A > ~~A but not A l- ~~A - also: l- A v ~A, l- ~(A & ~A), ~(A & B) -ll- ~A v ~B, ~(A v B) l- ~A & ~B, but not: ~A & ~ B l- ~(A v B)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, , Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 |
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> Counter arguments against Dummett
> Counter arguments in relation to Verificationism
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19