Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Putnam, Hilary
Books on Amazon
Connectives I 87
Interpretation/Putnam: is not a representation, but production. - E.g. classical connectives are not represented using the intuitionistic connectives, but the classical theorems are produced. - Putnam: the meaning of the connectives is still not classic, because these meanings are explained by means of provability and not by truth. - Change of meaning: e.g. assuming we wanted to formulate Newton's laws in intuitionistic mathematics, then we would have to limit the real numbers (for example, on the 30th decimal).
II 88
Then, in the classical theory, the connectives would refer to "provability in B1" and in the other to "provability in B2". Then the connectives would change their meaning when knowledge changes.
I 95
Realism/Putnam: the realistic conception of connectives ensures that a statement is not solely true because it follows a (any) theory.
I 96
Ideal Assertibility/PutnamVsPeirce: no "ideal limit" can be specified reasonably - not to specify any conditions for science - PutnamVsKuhn: if you do not believe in convergence but in revolutions, you should interpret the connectives intuitionistically and apprehend truth intra-theoretically.
I 97
Truth/Logic/Putnam: the meaning of "true" and the connectives is not determined by their formal logic ->holism ->Quine: the distinction between the entire theory and individual statement meanings is useless.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-28