Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Strawson, Peter F.
 
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Connectives I 214
Connective/Relation/Strawson: a) stating connective: (s) is a... b) stated connective: is in relation to..., is an example of... - Double-digit expressions are not designations of relations themselves! Predicable relations between things not relations themselves. - I 215 a) Species universals: provides classification principle, does not presuppose one - E.g. generic name. - b) characterizing universals (ch. u.): e.g. verbs, adjectives: provide class · principle only for previously sorted particulars · but also particulars themselves provide the principle of summary: e.g. Socrates as well as wisdom. ->attributive connection: (non-relational connection between particulars of various types). - I 216 Example of the characterizing connection between Socrates and the universal dying corresponds to the attributive connection between Socrates and his death.
I 216
1) Species or Sample Connection/Strawson: a) Fido is a dog, an animal, a terrier - b) Fido, Coco and Rover are dogs - 2) characterizing connection: e.g. Socrates is wise, is lively, argues - b) Socrates, Plato, Aristotle are all wise, all of them die - 3) attributive connection: grouping of particulars because of the characterizing connection. E.g. smiling, praying. - Each is a symmetrical form: x is a characterizing connection to y - asymmetrical: x is characterized by y. - Then y dependent member. - I 219 categorical criterion of the subject-predicate distinction: x is asserted to be bound non-relationallly to y i.e. universals of particulars can be predicted, but not by particulars of universals. - But even universals can be predicated by universals - I 221 new: distinction between object types instead of word types.
I 227f
Connective/Bond/Strawson: Special case: between particulars: e.g. the catch which eliminated Compton was made by Carr. - Solution: regard is carried out, etc. as quasi-universal. - Only quasi-universal: because action and execution of the action are not different. -I 229 Nevertheless: a simplification like Compton was eliminated by Carr has a different weighting. - Point: we have transferred the role of the subject of a predication to theobjects. - New criterion as a bridge between the two others.
V 121f
Concepts/Kant/Strawson: Objects may only change within the limits of recognition. - The corresponding restrictions must somehow be reflected in the concepts. - However, it is not about a specific connective but about the existence of any such connectives. - V 123 Concepts for objects are always summaries of causal law.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-01