Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Understanding: the ability to give reasons for a distinction or to justify a selection of options.
For the understanding of signs and words plays a role, whether one can connect an object with the word or sign, as well as whether one can replace the sign or word with another sign or word. In order to understand full sentences, the context must be grasped as well. A point of contention is whether knowing the truth conditions gives the sentence its meaning. In other words Whether there is the knowledge about what should be if the sentence were true. If that is correct, there is no need to know whether the sentence is true (cf. M. Dummett, Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992, p. 20). See also substitution, truth conditions, knowledge._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Chr. Peacocke on Understanding - Dictionary of Arguments
II 182 Understanding/compositionality/Peacocke: E.g. A single Russian phrase has been translated, so that we know "what Breschniev has said". - We do not understand this sentence, because we could not use the Russian words that we could perhaps not assign one-to-one to form Russian phrases ourselves - knowledge of what has been said, is not enough. >Translation, >Vocabulary, >Sentences. Compositionality: for conjunctions of sentences, we assume that if A & B are uttered, the speaker believes that q and that r - and it are common knowledge that the listener believes that the speaker ... etc. >Compositionality. For negation: that the speaker does not believe that p ... - in each case complete sentences that are bound in compound sentences. >Negation, >Language use, >Language behavior, >Meaning, >Sense. I 198 Thought/belief/understanding/Peacocke: if someone understands a sentence, it is ambiguous what thoughts he expresses with it (underdetermined). >Propositions, >Thoughts, >Beliefs. The language is not rich enough - only the object is picked, not the intension. >Intension, >Identification, >Objects._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 |
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> Counter arguments against Peacocke
> Counter arguments in relation to Understanding
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19